a1 B.S., 1993, University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D., 1997, New York University School of Law. The author, who served as Colloquium Editor for the N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal during the 1996-1997 academic year, is an Associate in the litigation department of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan. The author would like to thank Professor Arthur Helton for his kind help on this Note. 1 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1(A)(2), 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. 2 In 1967, the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees expanded the 1951 definition primarily by removing language limiting refugees to those fearing persecution "[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951." Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. I(2), 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter Protocol]. By inference, the Protocol extended the definition to cover refugees displaced by events occurring in years during or following 1951 as well. See id. The Protocol did not alter the 1951 definition of "refugee" for purposes of this analysis. The core elements of the refugee definition have remained unchanged for 46 years. 3 The protective provisions of Refugee Convention are executed through the various domestic legal provisions of the host nations. See Thomas A. Aleinikoff et al., Immigration: Process and Policy 781 (3d ed. 1995). See, e.g., European Immigration Lawyers' Group, Immigration Law and Business in Europe 33-34, 51-52, 67-68, 78-79, 89-90, 99, 131-33, 151, 164-65, 177-78, 192-93 (Paul Gulbenkian ed. 1993) (presenting the domestic refugee policies of Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), is the principal international body entrusted with the task of ensuring the proper treatment of refugees and finding enduring solutions for their plight. See Staff of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. World Refugee Crisis: The International Community's Response 253-320 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter World Refugee Crisis] (identifying UNHCR as the primary international agency for protecting refugees and coordinating action on their behalf). See also Gregory S. McCue, Note, Environmental Refugees: Applying International Environmental Law to Involuntary Migration, 6 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 151, 170-73 (1993) (explaining the historical development of UNHCR). However, the UNHCR's mandate imposes no requirement to ensure the physical welfare or even the survival of refugees. The UNHCR undertakes to provide assistance only in response to the explicit requests of national governments. See Leon Gordenker, Refugees in International Politics 30 (1987) ("[T]he Convention enables a person outside his own country to enter a claim to a government for asylum but gives him no right to it ... it is governments that bear the ultimate responsibility."). While decisions by the U.N. may appear to centralize the handling of refugees, the way in which individual cases are determined remains a matter for receiving states, who may interpret the provisions of the Refugee Convention in a variety of ways. See id. 4 The Refugee Convention includes a "non-refoulment" provision which prohibits the returning of "a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 33(1), 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176. The "non-refoulment" policy of international refugee law only applies to persons with official refugee status. 5 See Gordenker, supra note 3, at 31-32 ("The opportunity for education and training within the national framework is open to the refugee. Other social services, such as medical care, are also extended. In order that the refugee may become self-sufficient, he may enter the labour market on at least the same terms as other foreigners."). 6 Today, there are 128 nations signatory to the Refugee Convention. See Arthur C. Helton, Introduction to Open Soc'y Inst., Forced Migration Projects: A Proposal to Establish a Temporary Refuge Scheme in the Caribbean Region for Refugee and Migration Emergencies (Dec. 1995). Each is a potential host country to people who obtain official refugee status. 7 See Aleinikoff et al., supra note 3, at 718. 8 See Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(B)(1)(a), 19 U.S.T. at 6262, 189 U.N.T.S. at 154 (providing each ratifying country with the freedom to limit its refugee definition to people displaced by "events occurring in Europe"). 9 See The International Refugee Crisis: British and Canadian Responses 3 (Vaughan Robinson ed., 1993). 10 See David Keen, Refugees: Rationing The Right to Life--The Crisis in Emergency Relief 2-3 (1992) (relaying UNHCR estimates that the number of traditional refugees has risen from 2.5 million in 1970 to 17 million in 1992). 11 See Norman Myers, Climate Inst. of Wash., D.C., Environmental Refugees 150 (1995) ("As the problem overall becomes more pressing, our responses fall further short of measuring up to the challenge. The surge in refugee numbers is outpacing the ability of the world community to cope."). 12 See Aleinikoff, et al., supra note 3, at 718-19. 13 Astri Suhrke, Global Refugee Movements and Strategies of Response, in U.S. Immigration Policy: Global and Domestic Issues 157, 159 (Mary M. Kritz ed., 1983). 14 See Keen, supra note 10, at 28 (explaining that the "refugee population has come to include many millions who are not fleeing simple persecution ... but, rather, a variety of economic, social and political ills all over the world"). 15 See supra text accompanying note 1. 16 A third element within the refugee definition, the "outside the country" requirement, deserves mention. See supra text accompanying note 1. Only people seeking refuge beyond their country's boundaries can receive official refugee status. See Suhrke, supra note 13, at 159. Many people attempting to escape intolerable conditions will flee their immediate surroundings without ever venturing beyond the borders of their home countries. These internally- displaced people, by definition, remain outside the international refugee system and are ineligible for refugee status. Their only hope is to rely on the aid provided by home governments, international governmental organizations, and non-governmental agencies. See World Refugee Crisis, supra note 3, at 253- 320 (explaining that persons displaced within their own countries receive aid through international governmental organizations, such as the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the World Food Program, and through nongovernmental agencies, such as Catholic Relief Services, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, and International Committee of the Red Cross). Many believe that the "outside the country" requirement unnecessarily restricts eligibility for refugee status. See McCue, supra note 3, at 153 (arguing that a flaw of modern refugee law is that it overlooks internally displaced persons). The focus of this Note is people who have fled or will flee across national borders because of circumstances unforeseen by the 1951 Refugee Convention. Questions of whether internally displaced people ought to be eligible for refugee status, and whether the "outside the country" facet of the 1951 definition is too restrictive, are beyond its scope. 17 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. 18 See Myers, supra note 11, at 1 (estimating that while there are presently 22 million traditional refugees, there are an additional 25 million environmental refugees). Although it is difficult to calculate the exact number of people for whom environmental degradation is a primary cause of forced migration, it assuredly is a factor for the majority of non-traditional refuge-seekers. See id. at 14. 19 Norman Myers, a leading researcher on the environmental refugee crisis, has proposed a sweeping definition of "environmental refugee" which includes: persons who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their traditional homelands because of what are primarily environmental factors of unusual scope. These factors include drought, desertification, deforestation, soil erosion and other forms of land degradation; resource deficits such as water shortages; decline of urban habitats through massive over-loading of city systems; emergent problems such as climate change, especially global warming; and natural disasters such as cyclones, storm surges and floods, also earthquakes, with impacts aggravated by human mismanagement. There can be additional factors that exacerbate environmental problems and that often derive in part from environmental problems: population growth, widespread poverty, famine and pandemic disease. Still further factors include deficient development policies and government systems that "marginalize" people in senses economic, political, social and legal. In certain circumstances, a number of factors can serve as "immediate triggers' of migration, e.g. major industrial accidents and construction of outsize dams. Of these manifold factors, several can operate in combination, often with compounded impacts. In face of environmental problems, people concerned feel they have no alternative but to seek sustenance elsewhere, either within their countries or in other countries, and whether on a semi-permanent or permanent basis. Myers, supra note 11, at 18. However, this definition of "environmental refugee" is a purely sociological one. It does not provide new legal rights, nor does it accord official refugee status to this new breed of displaced persons under international law. See JoAnn McGregor, Refugees and the Environment, in Geography and Refugees: Patterns and Processes of Change 157 (Richard Black & Vaughn Robinson eds., 1993) (asserting that the use of "environmental refugee" as a category "confuses rather than clarifies the position of such forced migrants, since it lacks both a conceptual and a legal basis"). Usage of the term suggests incorrectly that environmental change as a cause of migration can be meaningfully separated from political, economic, and social changes. See id. at 158. While Myers' definition of "environmental refugees" is successful in describing the phenomenon for social scientists and the general public, it provides little guidance for policy-makers interested in fashioning legal solutions. For the sake of convenience, the term "environmental refugees" will be used throughout this Note. But it should be noted that this is a misnomer, as environmentally displaced people are not officially recognized as refugees. 20 See Myers, supra note 11, at 8. 21 See id. at 16. 22 See id. at 2. 23 Id. at 150. 24 See id. at 20. 25 See id. at 150. During the 1800s, "two-fifths of Irish people surviving the potato famine left their country ... [and] one third of people in Sweden and Norway headed for new horizons in large part because there was insufficient farmland to support their growing numbers." Id. 26 See id. (describing present and future loss of forests in the Philippines and the Ivory Coast, and present and future land shortages in Kenya and Mexico). 27 See id. at 1. 28 Id. at 150. 29 See The International Refugee Crisis, supra note 9, at 3. 30 See Myers, supra note 11, at 151 (stating that "the world's refugee burden is carried overwhelmingly by the poorest sectors of the community. In 1990 the twenty countries with the highest ratios of official (traditional) refugees has an annual per-capita income of $700."). 31 See id. at 151. 32 See id. ("stating that [i]t has proven all but impossible" for the "front line" countries of Europe--Spain, Italy, Greece, etc.--to prevent an influx of North Africans across the Mediterranean Sea and for the United States to contain the migration of Mexicans and other Hispanics across its southern border). 33 See id. 34 See Gordenker, supra note 3, at 15 ("Social, political and personal upheavals of the breadth and depth of current refugee crises lie beyond the capacity of any one government to deal with."). 35 See Myers, supra note 11, at 13 ("[T]he overriding objective must be to reduce the motivation for environmentally destitute people to migrate by supplying them with acceptable lifestyles."). 36 See infra Part II.A.1. 37 See Myers, supra note 11, at 10 (defining sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (citing the World Commission on Environment and Development)). 38 See id. at 9-13 (implying that remediating the environmental refugee crisis would include numerous complex steps such as: providing foreign aid, reducing the debt of developing countries, promoting sustainable development, enhancing environmental management techniques, and eradicating poverty). 39 Id. The processes that generate environmental refugees are complexly intertwined and perpetuate each other. They include: shortages of and stresses on food and agriculture resources, water shortages, deforestation, desertification, population growth, urbanization, unemployment, poverty, extreme weather events, and global warming. See id. at 2-7. 40 See id. at 13. 41 See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text. Signatory nations are technically bound by the Refugee Convention to offer protection to those refugees covered by the 1951 definition. See also Gordenker, supra note 3, at 206 (arguing that internationalizing the refugee burden distributes its cost in a generally acceptable pattern). 42 See infra Part I.B.1.a. 43 See Suhrke, supra note 13, at 157-62 (suggesting that the needs of environmental refugees may be equal to the needs of persecuted in the traditional sense of the 1951 definition). See also Myers, supra note 11, at 19 ("When people flee extreme deprivation as a consequence of grand scale breakdown, is their sense of societal rejection and human despair any less than that of people fleeing from political or religious oppression?"). 44 See Kerry Kennedy Cuomo, Human Rights and the Environment: Common Ground, Keynote Address at the Earth Rights and Responsibilities Conference at Yale Law School (Apr. 3, 1992), in 18 Yale J. Int'l L. 227 (1993) (grounding human rights norms in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). 45 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. 46 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter Political Covenant]. 47 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter Economic Covenant]. 48 The preambles to each of these three human rights instruments state that: "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world ...." Universal Declaration, supra note 45, preamble; Political Covenant, supra note 46, preamble; Economic Covenant, supra note 47, preamble. 49 In 1948, fifty-six nations were members of the United Nations. The Universal Declaration received forty-eight votes in favor and eight abstentions. U.N. Dep't of Social Affairs, The Impact of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 1, n.1 U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/5, U.N. Sales No. 1951 xiv 3 (1951). 50 See id. at 7 ("Herein lies the greatest significance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: it is a Declaration, not of one person or group of persons, not of one nation or of one people, but of the organized community of nations and of all the peoples throughout the world."). 51 See id. at 6 ("The Declaration not only incorporates the great victories of the past--victories in the field of free thought and opinion, ... [b]ut [it] points beyond these traditional rights to ... social, cultural and economic rights ...."); Universal Declaration, supra note 45, at arts. 2, 22-27. 52 See U.N. Dep't of Social Affairs, supra note 49, at 26-30 (providing examples of national and international documents into which the language of the Universal Declaration has been incorporated as evidence of its impact on national governments). 53 See id. at 22. The relationship between the Universal Declaration and the Refugee Convention was publicly acknowledged during the fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.325, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 325th mtg. at 337 (1950) (The Representative from the Netherlands "stated that the problem of refugees and stateless persons was above all a problem of human beings, endowed with human dignity and the rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."); U.N. Doc. A.C.3/SR.326, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 326th mtg. at 344 (1950) (The Representative from France stated that "[a]ll states were eager to recognize that ... no discrimination should be made between refugees ... [a statement which] was in perfect accordance with the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which France had requested should be mentioned in the preamble to the draft convention."). 54 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, preamble (original emphasis removed). 55 See supra text accompanying note 1. 56 See Universal Declaration, supra, note 45. The Universal Declaration sets forth these freedoms as recognizable human rights. Article 2 (freedom of discrimination) reads: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. Id. at art. 2. Article 18 (freedom of religion) reads: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. Id. at art. 18 Article 20 (freedom of association) reads: 1. Everyone has the right of freedom of peaceful assembly and association. 2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association. Id. at art. 20. Article 19 (freedom of expression) reads: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. Id. at art. 19. 57 See Gordenker, supra note 3, at 60 (explaining that, in protecting refugees, governments are protecting human rights). 58 Universal Declaration, supra note 45, at art. 14(1). 59 See Nehemiah Robinson, Institute of Jewish Affairs, Universal Declaration of Human Rights--Its Origins, Significance and Interpretation 58 (1950) (explaining that Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration refers to a "human right on the part of the persecutees"). 60 Universal Declaration, supra note 45, at art. 3 (emphasis added). See also Michelle Leighton Schwartz, International Legal Protection for Victims of Environmental Abuse, 18 Yale J. Int'l L. 355, 361-64 (1993) (discussing the right to life as one of the human rights threatened by environmental problems). 61 Universal Declaration, supra note 45, at art. 22 (emphasis added). 62 Id. at art. 25 (emphasis added). 63 See Schwartz, supra note 60, at 361-64. Schwartz claims that the "duty of states to protect the right to life should logically apply to circumstances in which a state's activities pose life-threatening environmental risks." Id. at 362-63. 64 See id. at 367 n.68 (listing Articles 12, 17, 23, and 27 of the Universal Declaration as embodying human rights which may be violated by environmental threats). 65 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. 66 Political Covenant, supra note 46, at art. 47; Economic Covenant, supra note 47, at art. 25. 67 Political Covenant, supra note 46, at art. 1; Economic Covenant, supra note 47, at art. 1. See also Audrey R. Chapman, Symposium Overview to Earth Rights and Responsibilities: Human Rights and Environmental Protection, 18 Yale J. Int'l L. 215, 223-24 (1993) (explaining that "[t]his right could be interpreted to prohibit state activity that would degrade the natural environment to such an extent that peoples within the state could no longer provide for themselves"). 68 Economic Covenant, supra note 47, at art. 11 (emphasis added). 69 Id. at art. 12 (emphasis added). 70 See Chapman, supra note 67, at 223-24 (suggesting that these provisions can be interpreted broadly to include a human right to the maintenance of certain environmental standards). 71 See Schwartz, supra note 60, at 373-75 (discussing the evolution of a substantive right to a healthy environment in international law). See, e.g., Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, princ. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 (1973) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration] (providing that "[m]an has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being."); Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration] (stating that human beings "are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature"). However, while signatory nations are bound to uphold the rights set forth in the Political and Economic Covenants, the Stockholm and Rio Declarations are merely aspirational in nature. See Schwartz, supra note 60, at 374. 72 See Chapman, supra note 67, at 222-24 (arguing that environmental victims can be protected by reinterpreting provisions in human rights instruments and incorporating standards of environmental quality in the monitoring of recognized human rights). 73 See Cuomo, supra note 44, at 227. 74 See Chapman, supra note 67, at 223. 75 See id. at 215, 216 (explaining that, despite the overlap of human rights and environmental protection goals, the two are treated as separate realms). See also Myers, supra note 11, at 17-18. An additional difficulty with expanding the refugee definition to include persons whose right to a tolerable environment has been violated is that it requires the ability to ascertain when the environmental factors in a given case have actually forced migration. Distinguishing the influence of environmental factors from other factors involved in any given decision to flee is a practical impossibility. There is no way to determine with any degree of precision how much weight environmental pressures alone exerted on any given refugee. See also infra Part I.B.3. 76 See Carlos Ortiz Miranda, Toward a Broader Definition of Refugee: 20th Century Development Trends, 20 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 315, 325-26 (1990). For example, the United States at one time provided refugee status to "any person who, because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion, who [sic] fled from a Communist or Communist- controlled country or any country within the general area of the Middle East." Id. at 320. Those who had been "uprooted by catastrophic natural calamity" were also considered refugees, although this provision of the law was never utilized. Id. Some European countries have also experimented with a refugee definition that is broader than that included in the 1951 Refugee Convention. See Suhrke, supra note 13, at 160 (stating that the criteria for refugees has been relaxed in some countries to include "persons who require assistance on humanitarian grounds generally, but those who qualify are usually given benefits equivalent to a second-class status"). 77 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, June 20, 1974, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter OAU Convention]. 78 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (Cartagena de Indias, 22 November 1984) OAS/Ser.L./V/II.66, doc. 10, rev. 1, pp. 190-93 [hereinafter Cartagena Declaration]. 79 See Suhrke, supra note 13, at 160 (explaining the unique political background of the OAU Convention as justification for the lack of similar subsequent changes in the refugee definitions of other countries). 80 See id. (explaining that "ethnic groups frequently cut across state boundaries, and made it easy to accept new arrivals"). 81 See supra text accompanying note 1. 82 OAU Convention, supra note 77, at 47 (emphasis added). 83 See Miranda, supra note 76, at 323-24 (explaining that the Cartagena Declaration was the product of a colloquium sponsored by the Republic of Colombia, the University Cartagena de Indias, the Regional Center for Third World Studies, and the UNHCR). 84 See McCue, supra note 3, at 174-75; Miranda, supra note 76, at 324 n.51. 85 See Miranda, supra note 76, at 324 n. 53. 86 Cartagena Declaration, supra note 78, Conclusions and Recommendations III(3) (emphasis added). 87 See McGregor, supra note 19, at 161; McCue, supra note 3, at 175 (explaining that the Committee of Legal Experts to the International Conference on Central American Refugees interpreted "other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order" to cover the result of human actions, not of natural disasters). 88 See generally Myers, supra note 11. 89 See Aleinikoff et al., supra note 3, at 718. See also supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. 90 See Myers, supra note 11, at 26 ("Whereas voluntary migrants seek to escape straitened circumstance, refugees need to escape intolerable poverty and extreme degradation of lifestyle--even the prospect of starvation or other life-threatening dangers. Migrants seek an enhanced livelihood, refugees want to stay alive."). 91 See Miranda, supra note 76, at 323 (explaining that refugees meeting the traditional definitional requirements continue to receive complete protection under the OAU Convention). 92 See McCue, supra note 3, at 174. 93 See Suhrke, supra note 13, at 157-62. Additionally, the African "refugee movements did not typically flow from very poor to very rich states. The refugees, consequently, had no strong incentives to remain in the country of [refuge] once the conflict at home had subsided." Id. at 160. The result was that refugees did not need permanent protection under the OAU Convention. See id. 94 See Myers, supra note 11, at 14. 95 See Miranda, supra note 76, at 324. 96 See id. ("The offering of temporary protection to the beneficiaries of the expanded refugee definition under the OAU Convention and the Cartagena Declaration ... signifies an important attitude change on the part of the territorial states toward humanitarian refugees, including the international treatment of refugees."). 97 See supra Part I.B.1. 98 See supra Part I.B.2. 99 See McCue, supra note 3, at 173 ("Past temporal and geographic limitations have been removed but the definition expands no further. Political pressures keep the system from expanding to address environmentally displaced migrants."). 100 See generally Gordenker, supra note 3, at 30-31 (explaining that national governments bear the responsibility for handling refugees). 101 See Aleinikoff, et al., supra note 3, at 718. 102 See The International Refugee Crisis supra note 9, at 8. 103 See Gordenker, supra note 3, at 5. 104 See Aleinikoff, et al., supra note 3, at 719. One judge referred to refuge-seeking applications as the "most sensitive of human claims in the international community." Id. at 719 n.2 (quoting Reyes-Arias v. INS, 866 F.2d 500, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Starr, J.)). 105 See Myers, supra note 11, at 8-9. 106 "No fewer than nine developed countries ... are today taking steps to further restrict immigration flows from developing countries." Myers, supra note 11, at 8-9. This includes the United States. See, e.g., H.R. 2202, 104th Cong. (1995). See also Arthur C. Helton, Anti-Immigrant Bill Flouts U.N. Agreement, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 13, 1995, at A23-A24 (explaining that H.R. 2202 sought to reduce the protection available to refuge-seekers). 107 See Myers, supra note 11, at 20, 26-29. 108 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 109 See McGregor, supra note 19, at 158. See also Earthscan, Interpretation of Calamity (1983); Anders Wijkman & Lloyd Timberlake, Natural Disasters: Acts of God or Acts of Man? 11-17 (1984). 110 See Gordenker, supra note 3, at 13. See also Myers, supra note 11 at 51 (listing "governmental shortcomings" as one factor with particular potential to generate environmental refugees). 111 See Gordenker, supra note 3, at 13. 112 See McCue, supra note 3, at 12. 113 See id. at 160. See also Wijkman & Timberlake, supra note 109, at 21-22 (ranking sudden environmental disruptions according to their negative impact on humans). 114 See McCue, supra note 3, at 162. 115 See Jodi L. Jacobson, Environmental Refugees: A Yardstick of Habitability 20 (Worldwatch Paper No. 86, 1988). 116 See Wijkman & Timberlake, supra note 109, at 21-22 (citing the increased incidence of natural disasters). See also id. at 29 ("The poor countries which suffer such disasters are the same countries in which environmental degradation is proceeding most rapidly."). 117 See McCue, supra note 3, at 158. 118 See Myers, supra note 11, at 68. 119 See id. at 39, 74 (explaining that desertification threatens at least 900 million people around the world, that severe desertification threatens 135 million of them, and that half of that 135 million are found in the Sahel). 120 See McCue, supra note 3, at 159; Myers, supra note 11, at 74. 121 See Myers, supra note 11, at 56 (Table IV.1) (demonstrating the current and anticipated population growth of Sub-Saharan Africa). See also id. at 54 ("[P]opulation growth can ... increase undue exploitation of environmental resources until they surpass thresholds of irreversible depletion ...."). 122 See Myers, supra note 11, at 74 ("At least 80 percent of [Sahelian] lands have been degraded through desertification and soil erosion."). See also Wijkman & Timberlake, supra note 109, at 35-36 (explaining why the soils of the Sahel are eroding). 123 See Wijkman & Timberlake, supra note 109, at 35-36. 124 See McCue, supra note 3, at 159. 125 See id. See generally Myers, supra note 11, at 48 (explaining that population pressures and environmental degradation are often exacerbated in the areas to which refugees migrate). 126 See McCue, supra note 3, at 159. 127 See id. 128 Wijkman & Timberlake, supra note 109, at 39 (quoting Alan Grainger of Oxford University). 129 See Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, Preface to Wijkman & Timberlake, supra note 109, at 9 (explaining that deserts all over the world are expanding). 130 See, e.g., Wijkman & Timberlake, supra note 109, at 38 ("For some time the Sahara has been encroaching upon the Sudan across a broad front at a rate of about five kilometres (3 miles) a year ...." (quoting Sudanese President Nimeri)). 131 See id. at 25. See also Myers, supra note 11, at 74 (explaining that the Sahel's annual rainfall has dropped by between 20 and 40 percent since 1968 and that this "represents the most substantial and sustained change in rainfall for any region in the world ever recorded by meteorological monitoring"). 132 See Wijkman & Timberlake, supra note 109, at 41 ("The next serious drought might well entail more severe consequences than the last one ...." (quoting Michael Baumer, French rangeland expert)). 133 See Myers, supra note 11, at 68. 134 See id. at 71. 135 See id. ("[S]ince 1960 there have been over 200 coups, attempted coups, or other types of government upheaval. Persistent outbreaks of war, often prolonged and whether within countries or between countries, have greatly increased the incidence of famine."). 136 See id. at 52 ("Civil strife and other forms of conventional conflicts can combine with environmental factors to produce widespread environmental dislocations, even famine, and thus to generate refugee movements."). 137 See generally id. at 70 (claiming that human innovation, appropriate technology, and policy backed by political will could solve the Sub-Saharan African environmental crisis). 138 See id. at 68 (explaining that extremely widespread land degradation in Sub-Saharan Africa resulted in an almost constant threat of famine for the people living there). 139 See id. at 74 (recognizing that large scale population displacements occurred both within countries and across national borders). 140 See id. 141 See id. 142 See id. 143 See id. ("During the 1968-73 drought, up to 250,000 people are believed to have died because they waited too long to migrate, and during the mid-80s drought a still larger number is thought to have died."). See also McCue, supra note 3, at 159. 144 See Myers, supra note 11, at 74. 145 See id. at 72. 146 See id. at 51 (claiming that if governments cannot supply a basic necessity to a large sector of their population, such as food in sufficient quantity, they are surely disregarding a primary governmental responsibility). 147 See Jenny Tesar, Our Fragile Planet: Global Warming 8-9 (1991) (explaining that, in 1957, American scientists Roger Revelle and Hans Suess warned against adding excess carbon dioxide to the atmosphere). 148 See id. at 6 (explaining that countless aspects of human society contribute to global warming, including "driving cars, running air conditioners, raising cattle, cutting down forests, turning on lights, making computers, operating steel mills, growing rice, baking pies, flying airplanes, burning wood, manufacturing soda cans, ironing clothes, making ice cubes--the list goes on and on"). 149 See Tolba Says Lessened Political Tensions Make Global Environmental Efforts Likelier, 12 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 488 (Oct. 11, 1989) (stating that, in addition to carbon dioxide, over 30 other gases contribute to global warming). See also Tesar, supra note 147, at 35-39 (explaining that chlorofluorocarbons, nitrous oxide, and methane are the three other heat- trapping gases that contribute most greatly to global warming). 150 See Tesar, supra note 147, at 27-29, 81 (explaining that the burning of fossil fuels and the destruction of forests are major sources of carbon dioxide). See also Clinton Opponents on Climate Change on Wrong Track, British Official Says, 18 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 325 (May 3, 1995) ("The scientific evidence linking fossil fuel emissions with global climate change is 'as close as can be to certain in an uncertain world' ...." (quoting John Gummer, U.K. Secretary of State for the Environment)); Dean E. Abrahamson, The Challenge of Global Warming 7 (1989) (claiming that carbon dioxide is the single most important greenhouse gas, accounting for about half of all global warming). 151 See Tesar, supra note 147, at 6 (explaining that the term "Greenhouse Effect" comes from "carbon dioxide and other heat-trapping gases ... acting much like the glass in a greenhouse. Glass allows solar energy to enter the greenhouse but prevents heat energy from escaping."). 152 See id. at 51 (quoting James E. Hansen, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies). 153 See id. at 6. 154 See John Houghton, Climate Change Calls for Action Now, 6 Soc'y of Chemical Industry 232 (Mar. 18, 1996). 155 See supra Part II.A.1. See generally Myers, supra note 11, at 7-8, 134. 156 See Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the 21st Century 109-10 (1993). See also Myers, supra note 11, at 136 (explaining why global warming may increase the number of hurricanes and coastal floods). 157 See Myers, supra note 11, at 7, 139. 158 See id. at 7, 134, 136. See also Houghton, supra note 154, at 232 (explaining that global warming alters the hydrological cycle so that rainfall will become heavy in certain areas and nearly nonexistent in others). 159 See Myers, supra note 11, at 8. 160 See Jacobson, supra note 115, at 38. 161 See Myers, supra note 11, at 134 (citing the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1990) as saying that "[t]he gravest effects of climate change may be those on human migration as millions are uprooted by shoreline erosion, coastal flooding and agricultural disruption"). 162 See Tesar, supra note 147, at 60 (explaining that as water heats, it expands or increases in volume). 163 See Paul Lewis, Island Nations Fear A Rise in the Sea, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1992, at A3. See also Tesar, supra note 147, at 60. 164 See Lewis, supra note 163, at A3 (quoting John C. Topping, President of the Climate Institute of Washington, D.C.). 165 See Myers, supra note 11, at 135 (explaining that a relative sea level rise of three feet means that some areas will suffer more drastically than others). See also Tesar, supra note 147, at 61 (claiming that "if global warming accelerates and the ice melts faster than expected, ocean levels may rise as much as 10 feet ... by 2100"). 166 See United Nations Environmental Program, Information Unit on Climate Change, Climate Change Scenarios: Will There be Growing Numbers of Environmental Migrants? (visited Oct. 22, 1997) . 167 See Myers, supra note 11, at 139-46. 168 See id. at 8. 169 See Simon Haydon, For Pacific Islands, Global Warming Could Mean Extinction, Reuters Lib. Rep., June 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File (stating that the many South Pacific islands may just disappear due to global warming). See generally Lewis, supra note 164, at A3. 170 See Kennedy, supra note 156, at 109-10, 176. 171 See Myers, supra note 11, at 5, 127. 172 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 163, at A3 (reporting that nations most at risk are already feeling the effects of sea level rise and have created organizations such as the Alliance of Small Island States, a 37-nation coalition voicing concern that its member nations are in danger as part of its overall effort to halt this environmental crisis). 173 See Stevenson Swanson, Was Anyone Listening? Failures of '92 Earth Summit Spur a New One, Chi. Trib., June 22, 1997, at C6. C.f. Houghton, supra note 154, at 232 (implying that even if gas concentrations are stabilized, sea levels will continue to rise for many centuries). 174 UNCED, Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature June 4, 1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) [hereinafter FCCC]. The FCCC divided the parties into two annexes--Annex I and Annex II. Annex I countries include those developed countries that agreed to reduce their emissions in greenhouse gases (GHGs) and to help other countries reduce their emissions as well. They include: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the European Community, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States. Annex II countries are developing countries who will have less stringent requirements to reduce emissions and will have technical assistance from developed nations to complete the job. 175 See William C. Burns, Global Warming--The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 Dick. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 147, 173 (1997). 176 See generally John Blau, Talks Continue After Bonn Disappointment in Effort to Reach Common Ground by Kyoto, 20 Int'l Env't Rep (BNA) No. 23, at 1037 (Nov. 12, 1997) (delineating the U.S., Russian Federation, European Union, developing countries (Group of 77), and Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) proposals for GHG reductions). 177 See generally Burns, supra note 175, at 147-50. 178 The first session of the parties convened in Berlin on March 28, 1995; the second was in Geneva in 1996; the third took place in Kyoto in December 1997. See id. at 178-80. A fourth Conference of the Parties (COP) is scheduled for Buenos Aires in November 1998. See Lori Tripoli, Greenhouse Gas: Who's Happy About Kyoto? 13(8) Envtl. Compliance & Litig. Strategy 1 (1998). 179 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties: Decisions Adopted by the First Session (Berlin) March 28-April 7, 1995, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1671 (1995). 180 See Final Draft of Kyoto Protocol to U.N. Climate Change Convention Issued December 10, 1997, 20 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1150 (Dec. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. The Protocol provides for differentiated targets and timetables, with each developed country agreeing to reduce emissions by a different amount. The total emissions reduction worldwide will average out to six percent of 1990 levels. See Cheryl Hogue & Toshio Aritake, Countries Adopt Agreement for 6 Percent Emission Cut by 2008- 2012, 20 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1107 (Dec. 10, 1997) (stating that the Protocol requires the United States to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by seven percent from 1990 levels between 2008-2012, while the European Union must achieve an eight percent reduction in that time period and Japan must fulfill a six percent cut). The Protocol also allows for joint implementation (i.e., countries may help each other to reduce emissions as a means of fulfilling their own obligations to reduce emissions) and tradable permits in greenhouse gases, which will allow countries to buy and sell the right to pollute beyond their individual allowances. See Kyoto Protocol, supra, at art. 6. 181 See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (stating unanimously that the United States would not agree to a protocol unless it "also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period"). See also Tripoli, supra note 178, at 1 ("President Clinton has made it clear that the protocol is unacceptable in its current form." (quoting Craig Ebert of ICF Kaiser Consulting Group)). 182 See Burns, supra note 175, at 177 (stating that, despite the FCCC, carbon emissions continue to rise significantly in the United States and Western Europe). 183 See Tripoli, supra note 178, at 1 (criticizing the Protocol because it actually allows some countries, such as Australia, to increase emissions over 1990 levels). 184 See id. at 185 ("[F]rom a strict cost/benefit analysis, many of the major greenhouse gas emitting actors have very little incentive to make the sacrifices essential to meaningfully address climate change, at least over the next few decades."). The cost of reducing GHG emissions is often cited as a reason for the lack of governmental commitments: The national income to the United States, by one estimate, was expected to decrease by only .25 percent from a doubling of carbon dioxide. On the other hand, the cost of restricting carbon dioxide emissions to 1990 levels and thereafter reducing them to eighty percent of 1990 levels by the year 2020 had been estimated at over $3.5 trillion. Thus, the United States, as the leading source of atmospheric carbon dioxide, had the most to lose from aggressive abatement, but not necessarily as much to gain. Id. 185 Climate change does differ slightly from other examples of long-term degradation in that no individual government is primarily at fault. These displaced persons will be seeking refuge from an environmental crisis caused by the collective actions of many national governments, not by a specific homeland government. This distinction, though important, barely alters the analysis. Environmental refugees displaced by climate change and sea level rise will have no choice but to seek assistance under international law like all other refugees. 186 See Robert E. Ebel, Chernobyl and its Aftermath 1 (1994); Zhores A. Medvedev, The Legacy of Chernobyl 76 (1990) (explaining that the "release of radioactivity was extended over ten days"). 187 See David R. Marples, Chernobyl and Nuclear Power in the USSR 33 (1986). 188 See Chris C. Park, Chernobyl--The Long Shadow 1 (1989). 189 See id. at 6. 190 See id. at 15. 191 See Marples, supra note 187, at 35. 192 See id. at 34. 193 See id. at 34-35. 194 See id. 195 See Ebel, supra note 186, at 2. 196 See Marples, supra note 187, at 16. 197 See Park, supra note 188, at preface. 198 See Ebel, supra note 186, at 21. 199 See Park, supra note 188, at preface. 200 See id. at 29. Many people who were inhabiting the areas surrounding the nuclear station at the time of the accident are likely to contract cancer within the next thirty years and will ultimately die as a result of Chernobyl. See id. 201 See Medvedev, supra note 186, at 82. 202 See id. at 77. 203 See Ebel, supra note 186, at ix (stating that eight years after the explosion, contamination levels in regions are still unacceptable for human exposure). 204 See Marples, supra note 187, at 146 (explaining that "little care was taken to keep families together, and many evacuees were unaware of the length of time that would be spent away from home"). 205 See Ebel, supra note 186, at ix. 206 See id. at 2 (explaining that "a number of elderly residents have returned, local officials having concluded that the amounts of radiation to which they may be subjected will not interfere with their remaining years of life"). 207 Campaign Leader Wins Award, The Irish Times (Feb. 6, 1996) (quoting Adi Roche, winner of the European of the Year Award for raising over half a million dollars for victims of the Chernobyl disaster through the Chernobyl Children's Project, which she founded). 208 Id. 209 See Marples, supra note 187, at 8. 210 See Medvedev, supra note 186, at 13. 211 See id. at 12, 14 (explaining, inter alia, that "[t]his kind of practice is not unusual in Soviet industrial construction" and that "[m]any industrial objects are accepted by the relevant government commission with a long list of incomplete elements and operations."). 212 See id. at 13 (explaining that the fourth reactor actually failed certain safety tests). 213 See id. at 14. 214 See Marples, supra note 187, at 35. 215 For a government to neglect its citizens' environmental conditions and endanger its citizens' environmental safety is not unique to the Soviet government or the nuclear power industry. It is paralleled by the actions of the governments of many developing countries, for whom encouraging economic growth is the top priority, no matter what the cost of reaching that goal. Industrial investment is indiscriminately encouraged and accompanying environmental costs are often intentionally disregarded. For example, in the hopes of generating rapid economic growth, governments of developing countries will permit industries to operate dangerous technologies in under-monitored, under-regulated, and, accordingly, more disaster-prone conditions. See Sheila Jasanoff, Introduction: Learning From Disaster, in Learning from Disaster--Risk Management after Bhopal 5 (Sheila Jasanoff et al. eds., 1994). Thus, the reality in most Third World nations is that the environment is in direct competition with the economy and continues to be deemed of secondary importance. See Michael R. Reich, Toxic Politics and Pollution Victims in the Third World, in Learning from Disaster, supra, at 191. The Union Carbide disaster at Bhopal provides a clear example of this phenomenon. The Bhopal disaster occurred because the government of India permitted the prospect of industrial growth to outweigh the importance of environmental risk management. See id. at 190. See also McCue, supra note 3, at 151 (explaining that the Bhopal accident may indicate a frightening trend in the creation of environmental refugees). 216 This statement was made by the three former Soviet officials in Washington where a 10th-anniversary service in memory of the Chernobyl disaster was being held. For the Record, Wash. Post, Apr. 26, 1996, at A24 (op-ed section piece excerpting a joint statement by the ambassadors of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia to the United States) (emphasis added). See also James Morrison, Atom Gone Berserk, Wash. Times, May 1, 1996, at A15. 217 See Glenn A. Cheney, Chernobyl--The Ongoing Story of the World's Deadliest Nuclear Disaster (1993). See also Jose van Eijndhoven, Disaster Prevention in Europe, in Learning from Disaster, supra note 215, at 113 (discussing the accidental release of dioxin in Seveso, Italy); Michael R. Reich, Toxic Politics and Pollution Victims in the Third World, in Learning from Disaster, supra note 215, at 190. 218 See Marples, supra note 187, at 146. 219 See Ivan Vladimirov, Problems of Displaced Persons Discussed, XLVIII Current Digest of the Soviet Press, at Apr. 24, 1996, no. 13, 18 ("The streams of environmental refugees include hundreds of thousands of residents of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova who were resettled after the Chernobyl disaster ...."). 220 See David R. Marples, Introduction to Grigori Medvedev, No Breathing Room--The Aftermath of Chernobyl 9 (Evelyn Rossiter trans., 1993) (explaining that in response to the logistical problems posed by remote coal mines, nuclear power plants were more efficiently placed in order to "provide a guaranteed supply of electricity in the heavily industrialized and most populated regions of the country"). 221 See Ebel, supra note 186, at x. 222 Over the 30 years prior to the Chernobyl disaster, there had been a number of unpublicized incidents at Soviet nuclear plants, beginning with the 1957-58 nuclear explosion in the Urals. See id. at 29-32 (suggesting, inter alia, that medical personnel at one Moscow Hospital knew how to treat radiation syndrome from experience gained at the much earlier nuclear explosion in the Urals). See also Zhores A. Medvedev, Nuclear Disaster in the Urals 4 (1979); Park, supra note 188 at 14 (explaining that the Urals explosion badly contaminated an area of up to 1,000 square kilometers with radioactive fallout and that some believe hundreds might have died as a result). Other reports of nuclear power accidents, though unofficial, do exist. For example, in 1966, a Soviet icebreaker experienced a "reactor casualty that led to a substantial leak of radiation." Marples, supra note 187, at 114. In 1969, "a reactor at the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant had to be shut down for repairs to its shield." In 1970, a submarine experienced a "casualty in the nuclear propulsion system," which caused it to sink 300 miles off the Spanish coast with 99 crew members aboard. Id. In 1973 or 1974, "the cooling system at the fast breeder reactor of the Shevchenko station broke down, and there was allegedly a 'severe explosion' there." Id. In 1979, there was a major fire at the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant. Id. In 1981, there were reports "about a pressure build-up at the Rovno nuclear power plant that damaged a steam generator and closed the plant down temporarily." Id. See also Ebel, supra note 186, at 31. 223 See Ebel, supra note 186, at ix. "When the former Soviet Union broke up in December 1991 into 15 separate and sovereign countries, 5 of those countries had a nuclear power base--Armenia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine...." Id. at xv. Yet "little has been done, either by the former Soviet Union or by the advanced industrial nations, to minimize if not eliminate the possibility of another accident." Id. Some have gone so far as to place "[t]he odds against another such accident this decade ... at 1 in 4." Id. 224 See Suhrke, supra note 13, at 157-62. 225 See Myers, supra note 11, at 26. 226 See supra Part II.A.1.a. 227 See supra Part II.A.1.b. 228 See supra Part II.A.1.c. 229 See supra text accompanying note 1. 230 See Gordenker, supra note 3, at 31; Jacobson, supra note 115, at 5. 231 See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15, at *44-45 (Dep't of Justice 1996) (interim decision) (Rosenberg, Board Member, concurring) (holding that young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of Togo "who have not had female genital mutilation, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice" constitute a particular social group); Denissenko v. Haskett (1996) Fed No. 404/96 (Aust.) available in LEXIS, IntLaw library, Auscas file (holding that being mentally ill constitutes membership in a particular social group); Fainshtain v. Canada [1996] 64 A.C.W.S. 3d 164 (Can.) (finding that Israeli women constitute a social group). Although the decisions in these cases encourage a generous application of the "social group" category, they by no means reflect the weight of international authority. 232 See Kasinga, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15 at *45 (citing Atle Grahl-Madsen, "a preeminent international law scholar," as stating that the social group category is purposefully broader than any of the other categories in order to protect against unforeseen persecution); see also supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (discussing the unforeseen character of present day environmental degradation). 233 A group consisting of persons who lack the political power to protect their environment, and who have experienced government persecution because of their group membership, satisfies the "common experience" component required to form a "social group" under the 1951 definition. Under international refugee law, "social group" has been interpreted to mean "a recognisable or cognisable group within ... society that shares some ... experience in common." Denissenko v. Haskett, (1996) Fed No. 404/96 (Aust.) (citing Morato v. Minister for Immigration, (1992) 106 A.L.R 367). 234 See Kasinga, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15 at *35, 35 n.3 (Filppu, Board Member, concurring) (expressing concern at the recognition of a particular social group for refugee law purposes when that group is not "recognized as [a] grouping for any other purpose "); Secretary of State, Home Dep't v. Savchenkov (Eng. C.A. 1995) available in LEXIS, UK file (stating that the term of "'particular social group' must have been intended to apply to social groups which exist independently of persecution"). 235 See Secretary of State, Home Dep't v. Savchenkov (Eng. C.A. 1995) available in LEXIS, UK File. 236 C.f. Kasinga, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15 at *35 (Filppu, Board Member, concurring) (noting that a social group comprising young women of the Tchamba- Kunsuntu Tribe of Togo who have not been subjected to female genital mutilation, and who oppose this tribal practice is "defined largely by the harm sought to be included in the concept of persecution"). 237 See Deeohn Ferris & David Hahn-Baker, Environmentalists and Environmental Justice Policy, in Environmental Justice--Issues, Policies, and Solutions 66, 67 (Bunyan Bryant ed., 1995) (explaining that the environmental justice movement first emerged in the late 1970s as the linkages between social justice and environmental protection were recognized). 238 See Bunyan Bryant, Introduction to Environmental Justice--Issues, Policies, and Solutions, supra note 237, at 6. 239 See Bunyan Bryant, Issues and Potential Policies and Solutions for Environmental Justice: An Overview, in Environmental Justice--Issues, Policies, and Solutions, supra note 237, at 8, 23. Many of these studies are focused on the United States and present evidence of a disproportionate impact of environmental hazards on low-income people and people of color. The United States took an initial step toward ameliorating this problem with President Clinton's Executive Order on Environmental Justice. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994) (calling on Federal agencies to help achieve environmental justice). The Environmental Justice movement has global application. Development throughout the world comes with a large price tag in terms of environmental damage and human suffering. See Andrew Szasz, EcoPopulism--Toxic Waste and the Movement for Environmental Justice 3, 166 (1994); Cynthia Hamilton, Toward a New Industrial Policy, in Environmental Justice--Issues, Policies, and Solutions, supra note 237, at 107. While in America the climb to industrial and technological superiority resulted in the ecological destruction and human inequality we currently experience, "[g]lobally the consequences include global warming, desertification, and environmental refugees fleeing from land no longer usable." Id. 240 See R.J.A. Goodland, South Africa: Environmental Sustainability Needs Empowerment of Women, in Faces of Environmental Racism--Confronting Issues of Global Justice 207 (Laura Westra & Peter S. Wenz eds., 1995). 241 See Myers, supra note 11, at 8. Making their political and environmental concerns known is equally difficult for citizens in African countries where "feuding factions have grossly undermined anything resembling a normal state system." Id. 242 See McCue, supra note 3, at 159. See generally Wijkman & Timberlake, supra note 109, at 38-40. 243 See Omari H. Kokole, The Political Economy of the African Environment, in Faces of Environmental Racism--Confronting Issues of Global Justice, supra note 240, at 171-72. 244 See Goodland, supra note 240, at 207-10. 245 See Myers, supra note 11, at 8. 246 See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 247 See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 248 See supra text accompanying note 1. 249 See supra Part I.B.3. The floodgates argument has been touched on briefly as an obstacle to the textual expansion of the 1951 definition. It is likely to pose equal resistance to the conceptual expansion of the 1951 definition. 250 See Myers, supra note 11, at 19. 251 See id. at 1 ("There are at least 25 million environmental refugees today, a total to be compared with 22 million refugees of the traditional kind."). 252 See id. at 23. 253 At worst, a broadened concept of refugee will result in increased numbers of refugee applications being received by potential host countries. The increase in paperwork may require additional administrative expenses to be sustained, but no signatory nation can legitimately extricate itself from its obligations under the Refugee Convention just to avoid increased administration costs. 254 The total numbers of refugees allowed in by host countries would continue to be limited by whatever mechanism the given national government chooses. Limiting mechanisms can take the form of permanent numerical ceilings or annual determinations. See, e.g., Aleinikoff et al., supra note 3, at 738 (explaining that in the United States the numerical ceiling on refugee admissions is decided at the beginning of each fiscal year by the President). 255 Suhrke, supra note 13, at 157-62. 256 See J. Patrnogic, Rationale of the Promotion, Dissemination and Teaching of Refugee Law, in UNHCR Div. of Int'l Protection, Symposium on the Promotion, Dissemination and Teaching of Fundamental Human Rights of Refugees 114 (1981) (Tokyo, Collected proceedings). 257 See supra Part II.B. 258 See Suhrke, supra note 13, at 162 (stating that it would be more meaningful to define "refugee" based on the need for protection and not limit it based on the cause of the need). 259 See Myers, supra note 11, at 9.