

Disambiguating Democracy

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(not for citation)

There is a high degree of agreement amongst British and American citizens at present that the political structure of their own state is validly described as a democracy and that the validity of that description in turns points reliably and reasonably clearly towards one of its principal merits as a state. Because of this widespread commonality of judgment, it does not seem in any way strained to employ the single term democracy descriptively in relation to forms of government and normatively in relation to processes of decision-making. There is a long, complicated and odd ideological and political history behind this state of affairs and no imminent danger of its ceasing to be the case (1). I want to argue that this situation evinces a high degree of intellectual confusion and seriously impairs our capacity to understand what is happening in the contemporary politics of Europe, North America and much of the rest of the world. I suspect further that it may also impair our judgment of how we are well advised to act politically and of what we have good reason to hope for or fear in the relatively near political future, let alone in what will or may come later. The core of my case is that the constant impetus to equivocation between description and evaluation built into the present sense of the word democracy itself drastically weakens political judgment and that the damage it inflicts urgently needs a remedy. I do not, regrettably, have a promising remedy up my sleeve, so I am in no position to argue hard for a positive conclusion. But the negative conclusion from which I in effect start, unless it is simply mistaken, is manifestly important in itself. I will therefore divide my discussion into two, arguing in the first part for the validity of the negative conclusion and in the second, and more tentatively, suggesting some more

positive trains of thought which at least fit with its validity and may in some measure arise out of it.

I

I take it to be a prominent fact of common experience that very many (almost certainly most) interpreters of or participants in the contemporary politics of Europe and North America do use the single term *democracy* to refer descriptively to forms of government and normatively to valued bases for taking decisions, and that, whatever their disparities in political taste, they also share at least the assumption that it is perfectly proper to employ the term in both ways. Why should we demur at this ?

If we are careful and explicit enough, why cannot we quite consistently use the same word in two different ways without confusing either ourselves or one another ? Plainly, nothing in principle decisively prevents us from doing so – only frailty, inattention and human impulse. Philosophers, above all, can reasonably aspire to rise above such frailties, and to formulate their claims and signal their strategies of argument with enough care and precision to avoid the confusion in their own case and dissipate it briskly when they encounter it in the contentions of their fellows. My claim is simply that even the most proficient of philosophers have in practice for some time found it hard to avoid such confusion, still find it hard to do so at present, and are all but certain to continue to do so, unless and until they come to be less wedded to the applicability of one or other sense (2). Even if this assessment were right, it would remain far from obvious which of the two ways it would be wiser to relinquish. The choice of which to desert would no doubt be made in practice on the basis of prior political allegiance, whether to an individual state which prided itself on the label, or to an articulated set of principles which even the most complacently self-described polity might readily fail to realise. To ask if democracy is possible here is rhetorically

effective (3) less because to do so is inherently transgressive and correspondingly striking, than because it is well calculated to disconcert most Americans by underlining the obvious – that you cannot coherently pride yourself on the merits of your own state, without rendering yourself answerable in the end to the grounds on which you believe that pride to be justified. But democratic theory, the extensive academic genre devoted to the study of why the American polity is an instance of the best form of government, how far it should be reconfigured to exemplify that form optimally, and which desiderata in what ordered structure best characterize that form (4), could hardly retain such shape as it has on the premise that democracy (a structuring of the appropriate kind) was plainly out of the question in the United States of America, and perhaps always has been.

If we view the present use of the term as a historical product of the intensely political history of speech about politics across the world, and ask why its use has become so widespread, it is clear that it is the descriptive use in relation to forms of government that has driven most of that history (5), and that that usage is therefore considerably less likely to be relinquished in practice than its normative counterpart. But that testifies more to its political potency than to its cognitive merits. An optimistic construal of democratic theory might seek in response to present some variety of cognitively secure normative allure as the source of that potency. But any such attribution would be hard to reconcile with the history of political speech in context, and at best vague or unstable in its location of either cognitive security or normative allure. A more promising approach to capturing its imaginative appeal would be to take it not as the presumptively known and stably authoritative answer to a schedule of pressing and motivating questions but as a frank recognition of the

variety of the desiderata we recognize when we consider who should decide what and how over anything about which we particularly care (6).

II

If we have few stable *ex ante* convictions about how, in the severe light of hindsight, we would be gratified for a given decision to have been made, why not simply prescribe that it could best be taken by taking the concerns of all affected by it, in some proportionate manner, fully into account before it is ? (7) But this duly modest proposal loses either cogency or stability at once as soon as we press the questions of how and when those concerns are to be ascertained, what manner of registering them genuinely is proportionate, and what it would be at any point whatever to take them fully into account and transform them into a decision. It is not historically plausible to suppose that the political success of democracy either as an evaluative term or as the conventional name for the sort of state epitomized by the United States, Canada or the Federal Republic of Germany has been due to the evident felicity of any particular mode for taking decisions, let alone any well defined form of state (8). The historical sequence is best viewed as a varyingly iterative sequence of aversions, connected imaginatively and politically to the transfer of power from one social and political group to another, through the institutional reconstruction of a regime. Viewed this way, the original sense of the word *democracy* is relatively clear: a regime which locates power in, assigns rule to, or embodies and reflects the strength of, the *demos*. More speculatively, it came to acquire the sense of a regime firmly committed to pursuing the interests, at least as the latter conceives these, of the *demos*. The scope of the *demos*, in this conception, has always been open to dispute and is likely to remain so. Its most important boundary

today falls with those not born to citizenship who would like eventually to acquire it, an increasingly urgent concern for all relatively prosperous states. In the setting where it was first applied, it took its sense primarily from the contrast between adult male Athenians of a certain age, and the far smaller number of more elevated male Athenians who had previously dominated the polis. Much the same contrast was clearly implied in its late eighteenth century European comeback, though the far smaller number of more elevated males in question in that setting were defined by legal privilege, did not themselves in most states currently hold political authority, and presented a distinctly softer political target than the royal governments which, on terms varying from one state to another, did hold such authority (9).

Even at the outbreak of the French Revolution itself, partisans of democracy were enemies to aristocrats before they were enemies to monarchs. Most favoured a coalition between monarch and demos, and even after mislaying the ruling dynasty, arguably remained at least as susceptible to monarchy as a structure as to any sharply defined alternative which consigned authority without residue to the demos and dispersed it accordingly (10). It is not easy (or in all probability correct) to infer a single clear causal structure in the outcome from this transfer of authority. In different settings at different times it has been offered by those making the transfer, chosen through some formal representative process by those left at liberty to make the choice, and brought within reach by sudden collapses in the authority of states which had long treated the demos as a fictional category, in face of challenge from large groups of their angry subjects.

As a category for repudiating the authority of an existing regime and registering the efficacy of that repudiation (how it began its life as a category in the setting of classical Greece), democracy takes its sense and draws its temporary

political *éclat* from the moment of repudiation. At this point, it can and does boast of a real political service, which only partisans of the fallen regime (self-identified *counter-revolutionaries*) have occasion to dispute. But this *éclat*, in the huge majority of cases, proves very transitory (*plaisir d'amour*); and there is no obvious reason why it should turn out not to. The displacement of a loathed political regime through what is often felt and experienced as popular choice is a vivid political good at the time; but it is a very poor predictor of subsequent levels of gratification on anyone's part. It provides, in more providential circumstances, much the same punitive service in relation to incumbent governments as free elections can hope to (11). But its retributive appeal is no more promising as a technique for moulding a desired future than its counterpart in criminal law, and wholly lacks the latter's presumptive tie to the recognition and vindication of violated rights.

Seen from this angle, democracy as a regime name has a fairly direct and imaginatively plausible sense in relation to the authorization, and more powerfully to the de-authorization, of particular regimes, but no tie whatever to justice, no guarantee of governmental efficacy, economic enhancement, or even governmental sanity. By itself it guarantees nothing at all, either as to consequences, or to the acceptance of side constraints on governmental action, beyond the re-enactment of free and fair elections. Even the latter constraint is flimsily guaranteed, not because it can readily be withdrawn (which would invalidate the application of the category), but because the criteria for freedom and fairness in elections, under serious interrogation (12), may well turn out to require a comprehensive reconstruction of the political relations, economic structures, and cultural substance of the societies in question. If democracy proves on reflection to require all that revolution promises but never in fact delivers, it cannot be a good regime name for the states in which we now live.

There may, in steadier hands than mine, be a dilemma here. Democracy understood as a maximally justified decision procedure, would legitimate rather handsomely, if only it could be established; but, in that guise, it is plainly not in current operation in any state at all. It is hard, too, to see how it could be implemented in, by, or still more as, a state. Democracy, minimally understood (universal adult suffrage, free and fair elections, a well-formed legal process with some degree of independence from immediate executive will, and a basis on which to protect at least its overall shape over time from immediate legislative will (13)), might be a tactful description of several existing states. But it could hope to legitimate only by contrast with potential competitors which openly spurn or deliberately subvert one or more components of that minimal understanding. The United States, for example, has reasonably free (if imperfectly conducted) elections and at least an approximation to universal adult suffrage. It has unequal, but not ludicrously unequal, votes. But no one not already wedded to the conclusion for other reasons could readily see the composite of these processes in action as equally fair even to all current citizens of the United States (14). Formal political equality, the equal right to vote, legitimates the United States as a state by contrast with states where most subjects have no right to vote for or against those who rule them, peremptory and binding instructions on whom or what to vote for where they are conceded such rights(15), and where they also face serious continuing threats to their personal freedom, should they choose to flout these instructions. It legitimates the United States more decisively by contrast with states which concede their subjects no right whatever to vote, a slowly vanishing category. But those states pose no immediate legitimacy challenge to the United States and can hardly enhance its legitimacy by their own deficits. Where the United States lacks some legitimacy within its own territorial limits is in the standing of its

public decisions in the eyes of many of its own citizens or longer term residents. It could hope to draw such legitimacy either from the conspicuous felicity of the decisions themselves (a great deal to hope for), or from the clear justice of the processes through which those decisions have been reached. It is unclear (to me at any rate) how any process for taking the variety of decisions which states do and must take could be clearly just, though obvious enough that many ways in which many do are quite blatantly unjust. But a state is a single structure, putatively unified at least in the last instance, and seeking a permanent flurry of activity to enhance and sustain that unity. A minimal criterion of democracy could be used to classify states into sheep or goats. It is hard to see how an appreciably richer criterion for democracy can be used at a state level to describe the world at all, and hard to see how it can be made compatible with the judgment that there are at present any democracies in the world.

III

Is this just exaggerated fastidiousness – a form of effete cultural condescension towards a political and economic reality which has enforced, is enforcing, and will undoubtedly continue to enforce, its own vocabulary preferences ? Is it simply impertinent, or inadvertently solipsistic ? I have two reasons for believing that it is not merely a neurotic personal idiosyncrasy. The first is that the political institutions of the wealthiest and in some ways freest countries in the world do appear at present to be losing some of their legitimacy in the eyes of many of their own citizens. This is a disputed verdict and I am no expert on the balance of the evidence, let alone the techniques for eliciting it. But it remains my impression that it is in fact the case. By itself this would be dispiriting but not necessarily alarming. Most human

communities have persisted with pretty muted legitimacy for most of their history as communities. Very possibly, for the future, all will always continue to. Why not call the more recently self-described *democracies* whatever they have chosen to call themselves and leave it at that ?

IV

The main reason for hesitating to do so is that that self-description is offered by them, and heard by many listeners, as claiming a warrant for their decisions, and that there is good reason to doubt the quality of some of those decisions over issues of immense importance. There are several such issues at present; but two are especially obvious and immediately alarming. The first is the challenge of identifying accurately and arresting effectively the cumulative damage to their own habitat inflicted by human action (and even reversing some of it). There has never been a more elaborate and opaque challenge to human practical reason. It is as yet too poorly defined, and it will almost certainly remain too interpretatively plastic, to relate it reliably to any well defined decision procedure. If addressing it effectively lies within the scope of human powers at all, it certainly lies at the furthest stretch of any range of problems which states can reasonably be judged to be equipped to handle through their own constitutive properties. In gauging how best to set about attempting to meet it, it will not assist us to assume that our own states are accurately, if abstractly, conceived as appropriate decision procedures. We need to focus as sternly as we can on the decision problem (what to do); and in doing that, any categories which directly vindicate our own amour proper, whether individually or collectively, can only distract us and blur our judgment.

The second issue is the faltering response to the inchoate trans-national menace currently referred to as the war on Terror. Democracy has already featured prominently within this as putative remedy for the political, economic and cultural circumstances which have provided shelter for the ‘terrorists’, and more concretely for the political hazards to the rest of the world’s population which emanate from ‘failed states’. Even by the standards of Reason of State this seems very unpromising as a general remedy; and it is hard in retrospect not to see its adoption as evidence for impairment of some states’ capacity for rationality through drastic misjudgement of the category’s implications. But whether or not it is historically accurate to see the United States or Great Britain as states seriously impaired in their own operating rationality by incomprehension of their own character as states, it is all too clear that their judgment on the latter point has not assisted them to see clearly where the challenge lies or to judge how to respond to it at all deftly.

V

I do not, of course, wish to claim that the public agency (or inaction) of the United States of America or the United Kingdom over the last seven years over the construal of or response to either ecological menace or the threat of terrorist attack have been immune to criticism on grounds of democratic legitimacy. In each state, both constitutionally and practically, decisions to go to war are at best elastically related to the expressed political will of the demos on any issue at all. The contrast between the war-making decisions of the Athenian polis and those of the United States or Great Britain over these years could scarcely be starker. In the British case there is clear opinion poll evidence that the demos resents this, no doubt in some

measure by now because of the infelicity of the outcomes thus far. There is no warrant in ancient or modern political experience for the judgment that the demos would judge more wisely, or even less bellicosely, than an incumbent government. But since the British or American demos today has little option but to inform itself about the grounds for war to a large degree through services offered by its own incumbent government, it is hard for it to nurture and develop an autonomous judgment of its own of any depth and reliability through which to ration its distrust or credulity in face of whatever services the government chooses to provide.

Some of the very onerous challenges presented by the combination of acute threat with almost complete opacity over its sources can perhaps be illuminated by pressing the question of what is disclosed, by whom, on what terms, and how, to presumptively equal citizens as of right. But, on any conceivable basis, much will certainly be withheld from many by far fewer. It is hard to see how any configuration of this space could be illuminatingly labelled *democratic*, though easy enough to see how some might convincingly earn the title undemocratic. Insofar as the demos cannot judge, it cannot felicitously decide. Insofar as it is prevented from judging, it cannot in good faith be conceived as having decided. Whenever a state goes to war, it commits its subjects to that war. For a democratic state (even presuming that to be a potentially coherent description in principle, and conceding it not to be a misnomer in the case in question) to go to war, its decision to do so must be a decision by its own citizens, whether by personal choice or by deliberate delegation. If, in dire peril and in the government's judgment, this cannot be so in the first instance, it must certainly be so very shortly afterwards. This is not effectively how matters stand in any state in the world today (not even those whose constitutions prohibit the extra-territorial use of armed force). Conceding that this is a difficult and perturbing space in the

contemporary organization of power, why should we see the classification of states into democratic and otherwise as in any way relevant to it ? Principally, I wish to argue, because the classification of states as *democracies* confers on them a gross surplus of authorization in this context, and mystifies or occludes both the practical and the normative issues over their decisions. We judge as poorly as we do because at least one of the main categories through which we describe and interpret the political world over these questions grossly confuses what is at stake in it.

VI

Unless or until a state is attacked with some ferocity from the outside, its decision to go to war is always a choice. Even then, it may well leave wide open the option of whom or what to go to war with. The plethora of subsequent decisions on how to conduct a war – by open assault, extraordinary rendition, torture, murder, the establishment of extraterritorial internment camps – is a long series of further choices. In none of these cases is it desirable for the choice to be seen as pre-authorized in content, though it must of course be made as clear as it can be made in each instance who, if anyone, is entitled to take the choice, and why they are so entitled. If anything can authorize these actions, it will have to be the actions themselves (and principally what they bring about). It can only do harm to accord them a presumptive normative enhancement or vindication from the presumptive status of the state under whose aegis they are carried out.

Even if you concede that there is something disruptive and bemusing at work here, this does not yet pin down quite what it is. My suggestion (naively) is that the mechanism is all too simple: 1. Democratic states are authorized to act on behalf of

their citizens in ways in which non-democratic states (which do not have citizens, only subjects) cannot be.

2. The actions of democratic states are therefore authorized in ways in which those of non-democratic states are not.

This is certainly a non sequitur. 1 says nothing about the quality of the actions in question, and concerns solely the relations between the state and its own citizens. In either case the substantive actions themselves can be justified or otherwise from every other pertinent point of view, independently of their provenance. Since 1 (as I have tried to argue) is acutely problematic in itself (unless read purely hypothetically, and without relation to the political world in which we at present live), it combines a spurious suggestion of normative validation with a further and equally unwarranted suggestion about the domain to which the normative validation can be deemed and expected to extend.

VII

Turning a blind eye to ecological menace is less clearly an action than going to war: much longer drawn out, and not plausibly ascribable to a few particular points in time. Depending on your own political sensibilities, you may conceive it as a huge array of purposeful tactical choices, prompted by their perceived pay-offs in situ, and augmented by a more consecutive and orchestrated strategy of obfuscation and distraction, or as a practice of calm and contented inertia, rendered rational by providential faith in the market and in future scientific ingenuity. We shall see (or, at any rate, our descendants will do so soon enough).

It is quite plausible, following Amartya Sen's cue on the incidence of famine (16), that the immediate damage inflicted by ecological degradation will be identified and resisted faster under electoral democracies than it would be under more authoritarian forms of state. But since the primary challenge is not with immediate damage limitation but with the recognition and accurate diagnosis of the causal factors in operation, and the judgment of how and how far such damage can be prevented or reversed in the long run, any link even to freedom of the press would have to be quite weak, and hold, if at all, only in the very long run (by which time we might indeed all be well on the way to being dead). There is no reason whatever in this context to view state inaction on the part of presumptively democratic states as any better vindicated by the *democratic* character of the state in question than with the latter's more overt choices over the making of war.

VII

None of this implies that a state which at least purports to express the equality of human beings in the ways in which it authorizes its government and the laws which it makes, interprets, and attempts to enforce, is not a better claimant to political justice on earth than one which attempts nothing of the kind. Whatever the scope of justice between and beyond states (17), the idea of a democratic state, in all its conceptual and causal instability, at least flouts the ideal of equality less brutally than any current competitors, and draws a degree of comparative legitimacy simply from this relative deference. Even if there is not a human right to democracy on this understanding (18), a democratic society, seen as a society of politically active and responsible equals, is a more compelling picture of how a human society could be just than any which abandons the political process more or less wholesale to the tender mercies of career

politicians. But these are refined and demanding ideals for human cohabitation on a very large scale, whether or not they can be coherently extended to the world's human population in its entirety (19). They are still not convincingly read as descriptively pertinent to the bases on which human beings cohabit at present within or beyond the boundaries of particular states.

VIII

As a formula for de-authorizing incumbent rule at a particular point in time *democracy* has carried an archaic and largely stable force since its invention as a word. It says little more than: "You claim to rule us, and we repudiate your title to do so." That is the tie to its political efficacy at intervals along this very lengthy way.

Where it falters, whenever it is sternly interrogated in the aftermath of even the most effective de-authorization, is in the subsequent, and inevitably more protracted and vaguely delineated, era of presumptive re-authorization. In the Athenian case, whatever its vicissitudes in practice, this offered a structure for ascribing responsibility with impressive directness, and for withdrawing authorization promptly and at will. There was no incumbent government to alienate responsibility to, over an indefinite range and for a long period of time: merely temporary military command structures in time of war.

No doubt the category of democracy could have had a quite different political history over the last three and a half centuries; and, very evidently, it could readily have had no such history at all. But the history it has had over this period has set it up to claim an authority which by now is not merely equivocal but very probably irremediably so.

You can see the ambiguity in Pascal's subtle and in some measure purposefully confusing interpretation of the Christian Church as a structure of authority:

“Church, pope

Unity, multitude.

Considering the church as a unity, the Pope who is its head is as the whole.

Considering it as a multitude, the Pope is merely a part of it. The Fathers have considered it sometimes one way sometimes the other. And so have spoken

diversely of the Pope..... But in establishing one of these truths, they have not

excluded the other. Multitude which does not reduce itself to unity is confusion.

Unity which does not depend on multitude is tyranny.” (20).

Francois Guizot took Pascal's formula as epitomizing the power and cogency of representative government and it certainly captures both the appeal and the precariousness of the representative claim (21).

Democracy is a more peremptory term than representative government and by now asserts a degree of legitimacy which representation at most suggests as a possibility. The Christian Church, however terrestrially articulated, is ex hypothesi a providential entity. It does not serve our present political interest either as a species or as citizens of particular states to try to think of our own political agency (or patienthood) through a category which pre-guarantees the avoidance of both confusion and tyranny. We would be better advised to stay on full alert to the ample prevalence of both.

1. See, brusquely, John Dunn, **Democracy: A History** (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006). The ambiguity of the term between form of government and normative decision procedure is distinct from (though potentially connectable with) the ambiguity emphasized by Raymond Aron, which forms the pivot of Stephen Holmes's suggestive, *Tocqueville and Democracy* (David Copp, Jean Hampton & John E. Roemer (eds), **The Idea of Democracy** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 23-63), p 23: "The word *democracy*, in Tocqueville's first and greatest work, is systematically ambiguous. It specifies, on the one hand, a social arrangement and, on the other hand, a political system. *Democracy* sometimes refers to social levelling or the collapse of legally maintained class hierarchies. At other times it refers to self-government or the institutions guaranteeing that rulers remain responsible to electoral majorities." Tocqueville was attempting to assess the causal dynamics of each and the potential interaction between the two.
2. Note that Ronald Dworkin, **Is Democracy Possible Here ?** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) identifies potential grounds for taking this decision with respect to the United States but rejects it neither because this would involve some definite intellectual error, nor because it would plainly be politically indiscreet to do so, but because he hopes to find a coherent structure of ethical and political principle which would, without absurdity, sanction its retention. I wish to press an analytical case for embracing the political indiscretion, if in the end also for political reasons.
3. Dworkin, **Is Democracy Possible Here ?**
4. Cf Robert E. Goodin, *Enfranchising All Affected Interests and its Alternatives*, **Philosophy and Public Affairs**, 35 (2007), 40-68: p 40 Is

“making collective decisions in a democratic way...a matter of expressing opinions or of aggregating votes or of deliberating together ? (And if “all three”, then combined how and in what proportions ?) Insofar as it is a matter of aggregating votes, according to what rules ? (Simple majority rule or something else ?) Insofar as it is a matter of elections, what makes them free and fair ? (How are campaigns to be conducted, electors apportioned to districts, and so on ?) Are there any substantive constraints on what democracies may or must do ? (Respect human rights for example.) Such questions constitute the warp and woof of democratic theory.” Goodin supplements them by one further question – who is to make those decisions ?- which his article attempts to answer.

5. Dunn, **Democracy: A History**
6. Dworkin, **Is Democracy Possible Here ?**, and the cumulative body of work which stands behind this, notably **Sovereign Virtue** (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 2001).
7. Goodin, **Enfranchising All Affected Interests**
8. Dunn, **Democracy: a History**, or in very concrete detail in the American case, Sean Wilentz, **The Rise of American Democracy** (New York:W.W.Norton, 2006)
9. R.R.Palmer, Notes on the Use of the Word “Democracy” 1789-1799, **Political Science Quarterly**, LXVIII, (1953), 203-26.Dunn, **Democracy**, chapter 2.
10. Francois Furet, **Interpreting the French Revolution**, tr Elborg Forster (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1982) and classically Alexis de Tocqueville, **The Old Regime and the French Revolution**, tr Stuart Gilbert (New York:Doubleday, 1955).

11. Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes & Bernard Manin(eds), **Democracy, Accountability and Representation** (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1999)
12. Dworkin, **Is Democracy Possible Here ?; Sovereign Virtue.**
13. Adam Przeworski et al, **Sustainable Democracy** (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1995)
14. Dworkin, **Is Democracy Possible Here ?**
15. See Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China (Mure Dickie, Democracy designed to underpin existing order, **Financial Times**, 16/11/07, p 8): "We will expand intra-party democracy to develop the people's democracy...[Members of the Communist Party of China must] conscientiously abide by the party's political discipline, always be in agreement with the central committee and resolutely safeguard its authority to ensure that its resolutions and decisions are carried out effectively." Chinese democracy consists in "the Chinese Communist party governing on behalf of the people...while upholding and perfecting the people's democratic dictatorship."
16. Amartya Sen, **Poverty and Famines** (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1981)
17. Joshua Cohen, Is There a Human Right to Democracy ? (Christine Sypnowich(ed), **The Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in Honour of G.A.Cohen** (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2006, 226-48)
18. Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, **Philosophy and Public Affairs**, 33, (2005), 113-47
19. Nagel, Problem of Global Justice ; Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, *Extra Republicam Nulla Justitia ?*, **Philosophy and Public Affairs**, 34, (2006),

- 147-75 ; Andrea Sangiovanni, Global Justice, Reciprocity and the State, **Philosophy and Public Affairs**, 35 (2007), 3-39
20. Blaise Pascal, **Pensees**, ed Louis Lafuma (Paris:Seuil, 1962), 604 (871), p 269 ; A.J.Krailsheimer (Pascal, **Pensees** (Harmondsworth:Penguin, 1966), 231-32) translates multitude as *multiplicity*; but since the authority relations in question held between human beings I prefer the more concrete noun.
21. Francois Guizot, **The History of the Origins of Representative Government in Europe**, tr Anrew R.Scoble, ed Aurelian Craiutu (Indianapolis:Liberty Fund, 2002), 52. For the filiation from Pascal to Guizot and beyond see Michael Sonenscher, **Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality and the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 153n